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Abstract 
 
Council Tax was introduced in Britain in 1993 and represents a unique international 
property tax.  There is a growing belief that it is time to reform the number and structure 
of council tax bands but such views have a minimal empirical base.  This paper sets out 
to assess the impact on personal and local government finances, and extends the analysis 
to the role of the tax multipliers linked to each band. The research is based on the 
experience of a representative sample of local authorities in Scotland. A statistical 
revaluation for 2000 is estimated for the existing eight band system, and from this base a 
ten band system is calculated.  Financial implications are then simulated for each local 
authority taking account of central resource equalisation mechanisms. The results 
indicate that increases in bands will have little impact on the burden of the council tax 
compared with regular revaluations.  Changing the tax multiplier range has the greatest 
impact on local authority finances and council tax payments. 
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Introduction 
 
More than ten years after the council tax was introduced into Britain in 1993 there is a 
growing belief that it is time to reform its operation.  In England the government has 
instigated the Lyons review of local government finance while the political parties that 
represent the ruling coalition in Scotland have also agreed to undertake a similar review.   
Although there has been a campaign to replace it with a local income tax the UK 
government has committed itself to retaining it, albeit as possibly part of a wider range of 
local taxes (Office of Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), 2004a). This is also the 
conclusion of the House of Commons ODPM Select Committee (HoC, 2004).   A major 
focus of the reviews will therefore be on the reform of the council tax especially through 
changing the number and structure of the bands and the potential for regional variation in 
these phenomena (HoC, 2004, ODPM, 2004b).  Council tax benefits have also been 
singled out as an area for reform but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.  It is also 
seen by the government as an issue to be addressed once the council tax structure has 
been revised (ODPM, 2004a).  
 
This paper sets out to assess the impact of changing the bands on personal and local 
government finances, and extends the analysis to the role of tax multipliers linked to each 
band.  The paper begins by considering the nature of the council tax noting its historical 
development.  The next section examines the underlying principles of the council tax 
bands. The remaining sections set out the research agenda for the paper, the research 
methods and the results.  The starting point for the empirical research is a council tax 
revaluation, as rebanding cannot occur without one.    In the light of the results the 
conclusions review the significance of the tax's parameters and the case for reform.          
 
The Nature of the Council Tax 
 
There has been a long tradition of local taxation taking the form of property tax in anglo-
saxon countries including the UK, USA, Canada and Australia (Loughlin and Martin, 
2003).  In Europe local taxation is less dependent on property tax but it is usually part of 
a spectrum of taxes including income and sales taxes. The Council of Europe (2000) 
found that 23 out of 25 countries analysed in the mid-1990s applied a property tax of 
some form, the only exceptions were Malta and Sweden.  The use of property taxes is 
also common in countries in the Pacific rim (Berry and McGreal, 1999). The basis of the 
tax differs from country to country, some tax only land, some tax only buildings and 
some tax both as in the UK.  Historically property tax in the UK has been based on 
rateable value of a property linked to the income generated and this still applies to 
commercial property.  The principal alternative approach is the use of market value.  
Council tax represented a major international development with  the introduction for the 
first time in the world of a banded capital value tax. Plimmer et al (2002) argue that a 
banded approach if properly designed in terms of the number of bands, tax structure, etc 
could overcome technical and administrative difficulties of the use of property taxation 
typically found in most developing and transitional economies. 
 
 4
The council tax system was introduced in April 1993 based on property values as at 1 
April 1991.   The principal innovation of the council tax was that household bills would 
be based on a banding system rather than a precise value as in the former domestic rating 
system.  The key attraction to the government of the council tax was the use of banding 
by reference to the average value for the country in question, therefore bands are distinct 
for England, Scotland and Wales. In Northern Ireland the rating system continued to 
operate with taxation proportional to values. The tax schema has a set of eight bands and 
associated tax multipliers so that the households in the lowest band (A) pays two thirds 
(multiplier) of the average bill (band D) and those in the highest (H) pays twice.  Thus, 
the highest council tax bills would be 3 times the lowest (see Table 1).  The ratios of tax 
bills between price bands are fixed by the legislation and can not be changed by an 
individual local authority. 
 
Table 1  1993 Valuation Band Upper Limits and Tax Rates in Scotland, 
England and Wales 
Band Scotland+ Wales England Tax Rate 
A £27,000 £30,000 £40,000 0.67 
B £35,000 £39,000 £52,000 0.77 
C £45,000 £51,000 £68,000 0.88 
D £58,000 £66,000 £88,000 1.0 
E £80,000 £90,000 £120,000 1.22 
F £106,000 £120,000 £160,000 1.44 
G £212,000 £240,000 £320,000 1.67 
H  > £212,000 > £240,000 > £320,000 2.0 
+Valuation bands in Scotland are two thirds of equivalent bands in England. 
 
The level of the local tax depends on the relationship between a local authority’s 
expenditure and that which the government assesses its expenditure needs should be.  If 
the two are equal then the average value property would pay the standard national bill.  
Hence in two authorities that meet this criterion properties in the same council tax band 
would have the same council tax bill.  If a local authority spends above its target 
expenditure then this will lead to a general rise in council tax bills in its area allocated 
across the price bands in the ratio set by the legislation.  Similarly if a local authority’s 
spending is below its assessment council tax bills will be reduced below the national 
average according to the same formula. 
 
The grant system in this way should equalise for uneven needs across local authorities 
provided the government’s assessment of local needs is accurate.  Similarly the system 
should also ensure resource equalisation between local authorities with different tax 
bases, ie account for the variation between numbers of properties in different tax bands 
between authorities.  This is achieved by ensuring that provided a local authority meets 
its expenditure needs assessment then it will only need to raise the requisite tax from 
properties in each tax band.  Hence even if a local authority’s tax base consists of just 
band A properties it will still only be required to charge households two thirds of the 
national average council tax provided it achieves its spending assessment target (Hills 
and Sutherland, 1991). 
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The government saw administrative benefits to the council tax over the previous systems 
because registers of adults were not required, it avoided the necessity of precise property 
valuation and there was no need for general regular or frequent revaluations. This view 
was reaffirmed in 1998 by the UK Labour government when it announced no plans to 
undertake a revaluation (DETR, 1998).   As a consequence to date there has been no 
revaluation in the UK although the government has now legislated for ten yearly 
revaluations.  The first revaluation took effect in Wales on 1 April 2005 while in England 
a first was due to be implemented in 2007 based on 2005 valuations (ODPM, 2004a), but 
has now been deferred for at least a further three years.   Revaluation represents a logical 
watershed in the development of the tax and an opportunity for reform.  Wales has taken 
the opportunity to add an extra band by splitting the top band (National Assembly of 
Wales, 2004).   
 
 
The Underlying Principles of Council Tax Bands 
 
From the beginning there were concerns about the nature of the bands. For example, 
reservations were raised by the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA, 1991) 
about the narrow range of the proposed bands as lacking fairness.  It is this relationship 
between fairness and the banding system that has been at the core of much of the 
subsequent debate and research.  This is perhaps not surprising, Beaumont (1992) notes 
that the perceived fairness of the property valuation system is the central issue that 
perennially challenges property taxation throughout the world. 
 
The equity of the bands has dominated research.  Plimmer et al (1999) argue that the 
lower bands are too wide because of the range of properties that can lie within it.  They 
quote RICS (1998, p3) referring to the English bands, 
 
“The bands themselves are….. far too wide, especially in depressed areas.  To 
take an extreme example, there are those living in caravans or semi-derelict 
properties which could not command a price of more than (or even as much as) 
£10,000, who will object to being included in a band that includes properties 
worth up to four times as much…”    
  
Their view is that while in theory the rebate system will reduce this effect because it is 
administered ‘outside’ the normal council tax collection rebate take up will be 
incomplete.  Plimmer et al (1999) further argue that the tax is regressive because the 
effective tax rate falls significantly as house price rises. In England they calculate that the 
tax rate falls from 2.06% of capital value for band A to 0.38% for band H.  However, the 
analysis above takes no direct account of incomes and its distribution.  
 
Plimmer et al (1999) further comment that there is a strong case for expanding the 
number of bands at the top end of the price spectrum. Muellbauer and Cameron (2000) 
also set out a case for reform that covers many of the same points. They argue for three 
essential reforms specific to the housing market - valuations every two or three years, tax 
rates proportional to house values, and (if a banding system is to be retained) at least six 
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new bands over £320,000.  Plimmer (1999) also points to the lack of regular revaluations 
as a source of regressivity.  Davis et al (2004) explore the impact of changing the size of 
bands using data on Northern Ireland and finds an inverse relationship between their 
width and progressivity. 
 
Kenway and Palmer (1999) at the New Policy Institute (NPI) take the view that the 
current bands and tax multipliers are arbitrary and regressive. They argue that the flat 
appearance of the council tax in the peripheral regions is a justification for splitting band 
A and that band G should also be split.  This is because the 2:1 ratio between the upper 
and lower limits (in England) of these bands is much larger than the ratios in the other 
bands which are typically 1.3:1.  Kenway and Palmer (1999) also support an increase in 
the range of tax multipliers from 3 to 6. They see the proposals as helping the less 
wealthy at the expense of those living in the expensive properties, ie a 'modest' 
redistribution of wealth.  This proposal will, they argue, also help those on low incomes.  
Although those on council tax benefit would not gain directly they argue that it would 
help many just above the benefit threshold and help reduce the 'benefits trap'. 
 
The NPI (2004) have further developed their ideas in an influential paper examining a 
range of options for reform within a regional context. In this paper, presented to the 
Balance of Funding Review (ODPM, 2004b), the simulation outcomes of these options 
are considered and then judged against explicit equity criteria.  These options are: 
 
• basic revaluation; 
• revaluation with lower band limits; 
• expansion to ten bands by splitting bands A and G for reasons noted in the previous 
paragraph with a range of 'income proportional' multipliers of 5; ten bands and 'price 
proportional' multipliers with a range of 24; and 
• a regionally differentiated ten band system with 'income related' multipliers.   
 
The results of simulations are presented in the form of national aggregate and regional 
numerical changes in bands and tax bills.    
 
The paper reviews these options and associated simulations and concludes that 
revaluations encompassing eight bands are not an acceptable way forward because of the 
adverse distributional impacts.  This is because households living in the less expensive 
properties of the high inflation regions will lose most.  This problem still exists with the 
expansion of bands while increasing the multiplier range to 24 entails a substantial shift 
in the balance of central government funding through resource equalisation between 
regions and very large changes in household bills.  The authors conclude that they favour 
the final regional option to resolve their perceived main deficiency of the national 
approach, namely the low banded properties in high inflation regions.  However, they 
recognise there are still issues to be addressed - potential variation in the number and size 
of bands and multipliers between regions (although there are already differences between 
nations), and whether regions are the best basis for sub-national variation.    
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Research Agenda 
 
Research to date on the impact of the banding system has been limited both in scope and 
relies on aggregate or weak data.   Extensive research has been undertaken by the NPI, 
but the published papers emphasise results and lack detail on the research methods.   The 
analysis by Kenway and Palmer (1999) uses an (unexplained) model calibrated with data 
from the Family Resources Survey.  It assumes a uniform rate of tax across all local 
authorities, and ignores the influence of differences between locally determined and 
central government assessed expenditure for authorities, the role of resource equalisation 
and other allowances to local government. It therefore takes very much a central 
government perspective on the issue. The analysis also suffers from a lack of 
transparency with the model presented as a black box from which the results are pulled.   
Similar issues relate to the submission to the Balance of Funding Review that is based on 
broad regional price trends and average earnings (New Policy Institute, 2004). This latest 
paper also does not distinguish between the relative impact of bands and multipliers 
which restricts the applicability to the task of this paper.  But the major limitations of this 
research approach lie in the use of regional house prices and the lack of a local authority 
resource equalisation model.  
 
The use of regional house price trends ignores variations in intra-regional house price 
trends (a problem alluded to by the NPI).  This is exemplified by research undertaken by 
Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) (2003a) that examines variations in house price trends 
between towns between 1988 and 2002.  For example, the price change differential is 
almost 4 to 1 between the highest and lowest 'performing' locations in Scotland over this 
period.  This compares with the equivalent figures in Yorkshire and Humberside of 3 to 
1, around to 2 to 1 in the South East, Greater London and the North, and 1.5 to 1 in the 
South West (HBOS, 2003a).  These statistics emphasise the diversity of local housing 
markets reflecting distinctive local economies and the scale of inter-urban distances.  
Furthermore Jones et al (2003) demonstrate, based on the experience of Glasgow, how 
there can be significant intra-urban price changes over a fourteen year period.  Whilst the 
west end of the city saw prices rise by 42% other spatial sectors rose by only 8% over this 
period.  
 
This evidence suggests that by assuming fixed regional house price trends the NPI 
research produces a potentially misleading view of the impact of a revaluation.  An 
aggregate regional perspective also excludes the fact that local government resource 
equalisation is based on local tax bases. Rebanding and redefining multipliers alter these 
local tax bases and leads to revised funding of individual authorities by central 
government.  The standard central government distributional formula takes into account 
not only absolute changes in the local tax base but also relative changes between 
authorities. It is therefore possible to have a small reduction in the local tax base and also 
receive a reduction in central funding.  Even with a regional aggregate analysis changes 
in the banding of housing etc have intra-regional consequences which in turn have 
implications for local tax bases/resource equalisation and this issue is not addressed by 
NPI.  
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This paper follows the same research agenda as the NPI but improves on it by taking a 
more spatially dis-aggregated approach. The research here addresses the impact of 
banding and multipliers by taking account of local government funding structures, actual 
expenditure and council tax levels, and local house price trends.  The implications are 
considered in relation to a range of individual local authorities and council tax payers.  
The research is focused entirely on Scotland although the results are likely to be broadly 
indicative of the scale of (average) changes applicable elsewhere in Britain because house 
prices in Scotland rose by 118% over this period, broadly the same as the 122% average 
experienced across Britain (HBOS, 2003b).   However, it is possible that the greater 
inter-urban house price trend differences in Scotland may mean that the range of 
outcomes in other regions will be narrower.     
 
The research is developed within the framework of three 'scenarios'.  Scenario 1 is simply 
the introduction of a revaluation that is taken to occur in 2000 (from the previous 
revaluation of 1991) with the new valuation band upper limits adjusted to the level that 
keeps the ‘national’ relative proportions of property in each of the current bands constant.  
The bands and tax rate weightings used in Scenario 1 are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2  Band Upper Limits and Tax Rate Weightings Used in Scenario 1+ 
Band Upper Limits Tax Rate 
A £29,999 0.67 
B £47,999 0.78 
C £62,999 0.89 
D £79,999 1.00 
E £104,999 1.22 
F £147,999 1.44 
G £299,999 1.67 
H > £300,000 2.00 
+Upper limit on Scottish bands adjusted to 2000 prices. 
 
Scenario 2 involves the creation of two new bands to address the specific issues raised 
above by the literature.  This is achieved through, first, insertion of an additional upper 
band (G2) to the present structure of eight bands, A to G with the valuation.  This new 
band has the effect of splitting the previous band G.  The upper limit of band G1 is the 
mid-point between the revised upper limit of band F and the revised lower limit of band 
H.  This way of expanding the number of upper bands is chosen because the numbers in 
band H in Scotland are already small and, as a result, the statistical estimates of the 
number of properties in this band are less robust than estimates for other bands.  The 
other additional band involves the establishment of a further new lower band (A2) giving 
ten bands in all.  In fact, the revised bands A and B are used to construct three broadly 
equal (in terms of price range) bands A1, A2 and B.  Scenario 3 is based on the 
revaluation and rebanding of Scenario 2 but overlaid on this scenario is a change in the 
multiplier range applicable from 3 to 6.  Table 3 shows the new tax rate weightings for 
the top five bands and the bands expressed in 2000 prices. 
 
Table 3  Band Upper Limits and Tax Rate Weightings Used in Scenarios 2 and 3+ 
Band Upper Limits Tax Rate for Scenario 2 Tax Rate for Scenario 3 
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A1 £19,999 0.56 0.56 
A2 £34,999 0.67 0.67 
B £47,999 0.78 0.78 
C £62,999 0.89 0.89 
D £79,999 1.00 1.00 
E £104,999 1.22 1.56 
F £147,999 1.44 2.11 
G1 £219,999 1.67 2.67 
G2 £299,999 1.89 3.33 
H > £300,000 2.00 4.00 
+Upper limit on existing Scottish bands adjusted to 2000 prices with bands A and G split. 
 
To simplify, the analysis distinguishes three potential outcomes, Scenario 1 with 8 bands 
and a multiplier range of 3, Scenario 2 with two additional bands and a range of 3 and 
Scenario 3 with 10 bands and a multiplier range of 6. 
 
 
Research Method and Study Area 
  
The research is based on the housing market experience of Scotland from 1991, the year 
of the valuation for the council tax, to 2000 for a representative sample of unitary local 
authorities. Following the selection of these authorities the research has a series of steps.  
First, a statistical revaluation is estimated of the numbers of houses in the different bands 
of each authority for the existing eight band system, and from this base a ten band system 
is calculated.  The financial implications for local government and council tax payers of 
both the statistical revaluation, the introduction of new valuation bands to the council tax 
system and reweighting the multipliers are then estimated.  These forecasts are calculated 
by working through the alterations to the council tax base for each of the individual local 
authorities and accounting for the resource equalisation mechanisms of the Scottish 
Executive.   
 
A representative sample of local authorities is derived using a procedure that 
scientifically selects a combination of urban, rural and mixed authorities; economically 
leading and lagging authorities; authorities with a financial structure that is reliant on the 
council tax take and those with minimal reliance, and so on. The selection method 
involves the development of a typology of local authorities; the details of the procedure 
are available in Jones et al (2002). For each of these eleven authorities, listed in Table 2, 
a statistical revaluation of council tax bands was undertaken to create a database using 
2000 values.  The precise method is explained elsewhere (Jones et al, 2002) but it utilised 
electronic versions of the council tax registers and a repeat sales regression analysis 
based on individual housing transactions data derived from the Land Register for 
Scotland / the Register of Sasines.  Price indices are estimated for each band in each area 
and then used to bring forward all observed property transaction prices between 1991 and 
2000 to year 2000 market price levels. It is convenient to think of this process as a 
statistical revaluation.  The analysis suggests that, in relation to individual householders a 
revaluation is likely to have a significant effect in terms of creating council tax 'winners' 
and 'losers'. 
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To fully assess the impact it is necessary to derive new council tax bands linked to the 
new price level. Unfortunately council tax bands are not determined by reference to any 
underlying principles.  Initial analysis involved moving all valuation bands up at the same 
rate of price inflation but this produced excessively biased results (as NPI, 2004).  The 
statistical results presented here are based on the presumption that the 'national' relative 
proportions of property in each of the current bands remain constant.  Hence, the 
proportion of households in band A of the eleven authorities overall is the same in 1991 
as in our estimates for 2000. The new upper limits are calculated iteratively.  Using these 
new limits it is now possible to generate an updated distribution of council tax payers by 
band for each of the eleven authorities. 
 
These revised distributions of households are the basis for a recalculation of local 
authority finances.  Financial simulations are undertaken by applying the current local 
government financial formulae used by the Scottish Executive to distribute funding and 
equalise resources (the details are in the Appendix). The key to the resource redistribution 
between local authorities is each authority's proportion of Scottish band D equivalents.  A 
Band D equivalent is calculated by transforming each band entry on the council tax 
register by representing it as the respective multiplier weight.  Each of the band scenarios 
and reweighting of the multipliers described above alter the number of band D 
equivalents and are therefore simulated individually.  Hence the different scenarios and 
tax multipliers change the funding from the Scottish Executive to each local authority and 
hence council tax payments. 
 
A series of assumptions are made keeping allowances to authorities and local government 
expenditures constant; these include in particular total funding available from the Scottish 
Executive.  These can be seen as exogenous variables and the details are set out in the 
Appendix.  These variables are held constant at the observed 2000/01 levels in order to 
isolate the predicted impact of revaluation, the number of bands and the tax weighting 
system.  Two additional assumptions were made to facilitate the analysis.  First, the 
sample of 11 unitary authorities is assumed to be representative of Scotland.  This 
permits the total number of band D equivalents for the 11 authorities to be used to 
represent the total number in Scotland as a whole and create a closed system.  Second, the 
average level of council tax exemptions, disabled reductions and partial/full discounts are 
held constant at 2000/01 levels. 
 
 
Results 
 
Changes in Local Authority Finances 
 
Comparison of Tables 4 and 5 show the differential impact of house price trends on the 
tax bases of each local authority given by the statistical revaluation.   These simulation 
results for 2000 indicate that, ignoring a change of bands, Scotland's housing market 
landscape has altered quite significantly since the introduction of the present system of 
council tax in 1991.  Some parts of Scotland, such as Aberdeen, Edinburgh and East 
Dunbartonshire, have seen significant increases in property values and hence their 
council tax base.  Other areas, such as Dundee, Glasgow, Renfrewshire and South 
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Ayrshire have seen relatively poor increases in values and hence experience an erosion of 
their council tax base. The impact of the expansion of the number of bands from eight to 
ten is presented in Tables 6.  Each local authority is affected differently but notable 
effects include the small percentage of properties in band A1 in Aberdeen and Eilean 
Siar, while there continues to be a high percentage in this band in Dundee.  These figures 
are illustrative of the upheaval that is created; and in relation to individual householders, 
a revaluation and amendments to the banding system are likely to have a significant 
effect in terms of creating ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
 
Table 4 Proportions of Properties in Each Band for Each Local Authority 
(under 1991 system) 
BAND A B C D E F G H 
UPPER LIMIT 27,000 35,000 45,000 58,000 80,000 106,000 212,000 212,001+
Aberdeen 20.7 26.5 16.5 10.7 11.9 6.9 6.2 0.7 
Aberdeenshire 21.5 16.0 13.3 15.2 17.1 10.1 6.4 0.4 
Argyll & Bute 20.6 20.6 20.4 11.8 14.1 7.3 4.9 0.4 
Dundee 49.0 21.8 9.4 9.7 7.0 2.1 1.0 0.1 
East Dunbartonshire 7.6 8.5 17.7 15.5 23.7 13.7 12.3 1.0 
Edinburgh 15.8 20.0 17.7 13.8 14.5 9.1 7.8 1.4 
Eilean Siar 37.7 26.7 19.2 10.0 5.3 0.9 0.2 0.0 
Glasgow 31.3 25.1 20.0 11.6 7.5 2.7 1.6 0.2 
Renfrewshire 30.6 21.6 11.1 10.6 12.3 7.5 5.8 0.6 
Scottish Borders 37.3 22.5 10.9 8.9 9.2 6.0 4.7 0.6 
South Ayrshire 18.0 23.5 15.0 14.1 16.3 7.9 4.8 0.4 
 
Table 5 Proportion of Properties in Each Band for Each Local Authority in 
2000 Assuming a Revaluation (Scenario 1)+ 
BAND A B C D E F G H 
UPPER LIMIT 29,999 47,999 62,999 79,999 104,999 147,999 299,999 300k+ 
Aberdeen 9.8 12.1 13.2 24.3 22.5 10.1 7.2 0.9 
Aberdeenshire 30.8 16.4 20.0 18.3 8.9 3.7 1.9 0.1 
Argyll & Bute 17.8 15.1 8.2 18.4 21.2 11.4 6.2 1.7 
Dundee 44.5 30.5 8.7 7.5 6.6 0.9 1.2 0.1 
East Dunbartonshire 5.8 4.1 16.4 18.4 24.1 19.3 11.3 0.6 
Edinburgh 13.5 15.1 19.9 14.5 10.2 11.3 11.9 3.6 
Eilean Siar 21.7 50.8 14.4 9.2 2.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 
Glasgow 34.4 30.3 14.8 8.9 5.3 3.6 2.3 0.4 
Renfrewshire 26.3 26.3 16.3 11.4 8.2 6.4 4.8 0.3 
Scottish Borders 27.9 22.2 16.2 13.1 9.2 6.3 4.5 0.6 
South Ayrshire 25.6 24.3 19.8 10.7 9.3 6.5 3.5 0.3 
+Upper limit on Scottish bands adjusted to 2000 prices. 
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Table 6 Simulated Proportions of Properties in Each Band for Each Local 
Authority in 2000 Assuming Ten Bands (Scenarios 2 and 3)+ 
BAND A1 A2 B C D E F G1 G2 H 
UPPER LIMIT 19,999 34,999 47,999 62,999 79,999 104,999 147,999 219,999 299,999 300k+ 
Aberdeen 1.2 10.6 10.0 13.2 24.3 22.5 10.1 5.5 1.7 0.9 
Aberdeenshire 12.9 19.5 14.8 20.0 18.3 8.9 3.7 1.6 0.2 0.1 
Argyll & Bute 3.2 17.2 12.5 8.2 18.3 21.2 11.4 3.8 2.4 1.7 
Dundee 27.7 20.5 26.9 8.7 7.5 6.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.1 
East Dunbartonshire 0.9 5.5 3.5 16.4 18.4 24.1 19.3 8.2 3.1 0.6 
Edinburgh 8.0 6.6 14.1 19.9 14.5 10.2 11.3 8.4 3.5 3.6 
Eilean Siar 4.4 27.1 41.0 14.4 9.2 2.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Glasgow 22.0 14.9 27.8 14.8 8.9 5.3 3.6 1.8 0.5 0.4 
Renfrewshire 16.7 12.2 23.8 16.3 11.4 8.2 6.4 3.9 0.9 0.3 
Scottish Borders 9.1 22.4 18.6 16.2 13.1 9.2 6.3 3.5 0.9 0.6 
South Ayrshire 13.6 14.9 21.4 19.8 10.7 9.3 6.5 2.6 0.9 0.3 
+Upper limit on Scottish bands adjusted to 2000 prices. 
 
The specific financial implications for local government of both the statistical revaluation 
and the introduction of these new valuation bands are now considered.  As noted above 
these changes will alter the present system by altering the council tax base for individual 
local authorities.  This influences not just the amount of tax collected but has a further 
impact on the resource equalisations (for tax purposes) by the Scottish Executive.  Within 
this framework the section first considers the impact on funding from the Scottish 
Executive (referred to as Aggregate External Finance or AEF) and the subsequent 
consequences for council tax rates.  The analysis is undertaken for the financial year 
2000/2001 so that changes can be assessed by reference to an existing benchmark.  The 
financial model assumes that individual local authority non-housing revenue and national 
Total Aggregate External Finance (TAEF from the Scottish Executive) for all eleven 
authorities in our study are fixed at 2000/01 levels.  The estimated changes to the 
distribution of AEF between local authorities are not subject to the usual constraints set 
by the Scottish council tax safety net that limits annual movements (see Appendix).   In 
as much as the study does not cover all local authorities the results must be taken as 
indicative rather than definitive. 
 
Table 7  Proportional Impact on Funding to Local Authorities (AEF) of 
Revaluation, Rebanding and Reweighting of Multipliers 
 
 
 
 
Authority 
% change between 
1991 and 
revaluation with 
no change in 
multiplier range 
% change between 
revaluation and 
Scenario 2 
(no change in 
multiplier range) 
% change between 
multiplier range 3 
and multiplier 
range 6 of 
Scenario 2 
Aberdeen 
Aberdeenshire 
Argyll & Bute 
Dundee City 
East Dunbartonshire 
City of Edinburgh 
Eilean Siar 
-3.3 
 2.7 
-2.0 
 0.2 
-1.0 
-1.6 
-0.2 
-0.4 
 0.1 
-0.3 
 0.5 
-0.6 
-0.4 
 0.3 
-1.2 
 1.8 
-1.3 
 1.7 
-3.3 
-3.0 
 0.8 
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City of Glasgow 
Renfrewshire 
Scottish Borders 
South Ayrshire 
 0.4 
 3.2 
-0.4 
 1.7 
 0.3 
 0.1 
-0.04 
0.1 
 1.1 
 0.6 
 0.6 
 0.9 
 
A summary of the results of these simulations is shown in Table 7.  Column 1 sets out the 
implications of a revaluation only under the present banding and tax multiplier weights.  
Losses of funding occur to five out of the eleven authorities with Aberdeen suffering the 
greatest loss, 3.3%.  Balancing this Renfrewshire is the largest beneficiary with an 
increase in funding of 3.2%.   The impact of increasing the number of bands from eight to 
ten, after a revaluation, is demonstrated by column 2.   The results show only marginal 
financial consequences with the greatest losses for Edinburgh, losing 0.4% of its funding, 
and East Dunbartonshire (an upmarket suburb of Glasgow) 0.6%.  Dundee is the greatest 
gainer but only by 0.5%.   If the tax multiplier weighting range is doubled from 3 to 6 
(with 10 bands) then the consequences are presented in column 3.  The relative impact of 
this development is much greater than changing the number of bands for all authorities 
with the major losses of just over 3% and the greatest beneficiaries of the order of 1.7%.     
 
 
Changes to Households' Council Tax Payments 
 
Subsequent changes to individual council tax payments are dependent on location, band, 
movement between bands and the tax rate multiplier applicable.  Increases in the 
multiplier range will mean that even where council tax payments rise on average 
households in the lower bands could still have lower bills.  The local effects are 
particularly important.  The redistribution of government funding on individual council 
tax payers is exaggerated by a multiplier effect caused by council tax income 
representing only approximately 20% of total expenditure on average.  A reduction of 
central grant of 3% to an 'average' local authority means that its total council tax 
payments will rise by 15% although this figure will vary depending on the precise 
dependency on central funding.  Rebanding cannot occur without a revaluation, and this 
in turn provides the potential for many houses to move bands.  Jones et al (2002) find that 
the revaluation leads in some urban areas of the sample to more than 20% of dwellings 
shifting between existing bands.  
 
The impact on average council tax levels of the potential outcomes are therefore not 
easily presented because the standard comparative measure, the tax level for households 
living in band D properties, is not appropriate here.  The revaluation process changes the 
number of band D properties (and means that there is not a straight forward relationship 
between changes in AEF and council tax payments).  The analysis here is therefore 
focused not on levels but the relative impact on payments in different bands, but even 
then this does not account for switches between bands.  The pure revaluation (Scenario 1) 
has no differential impact on payments in the different bands because the multiplier 
weights remain unchanged (Table 8). However, households shifting bands will lead to a 
14-15% change in tax payments in bands below and up to Band D and as much as 18 and 
22% above D (this can be seen from the differential tax rates in Table 1). 
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Table 8 Changes in Council Tax Bills as a consequence of the Revaluation  
Authority % 
change 
 
Aberdeen 
Aberdeenshire 
Argyll & Bute 
Dundee City 
East Dunbartonshire 
City of Edinburgh 
Eilean Siar 
City of Glasgow 
Renfrewshire 
Scottish Borders 
South Ayrshire 
 
 
-5.0 
 2.2 
-5.2 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-5.6 
 9.9 
-3.6 
-2.8 
-1.1 
-1.0 
  
Table 9  Changes in Council Tax Bills as a Consequence of the Revaluation and 
Rebanding 
Authority 
 
A to 
A1 
A to 
 A2 
B C D E F G to 
G1 
G to 
G2 
H 
Aberdeen 
Aberdeenshire 
Argyll & Bute 
Dundee City 
East Dunbartonshire 
City of Edinburgh 
Eilean Siar 
City of Glasgow 
Renfrewshire 
Scottish Borders 
South Ayrshire 
-19.8 
-13.5 
-20.1 
-16.5 
-17.6 
-20.3 
-7.0 
-18.0 
-17.7 
-16.3 
-16.2 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
9.0 
17.5 
8.6 
13.5 
12.0 
8.3 
26.4 
11.5 
11.9 
13.7 
14.0 
-3.8 
3.7 
-4.1 
0.2 
-1.1 
-4.4 
11.6 
-1.6 
-1.2 
0.4 
0.6 
 
The changes in council tax bills (assuming no change in band) as a consequence of 
revaluation/rebanding are presented in Table 9 and broadly show that bill decreases are 
dampened and increases exaggerated in local authority areas as a consequence of 
increasing the number of bands.  There are also three authorities were general decreases 
are turned into marginal increases for most bands. These differences stem from the 
changes in an authority's band D equivalents brought about by the increase in bands.  
Major changes are limited to new bands A1 (decreases) and G2 (increases).   Much more 
dramatic distributional changes between bands occur when there is a reweighting from 
three to six as shown in Table 10.  The scale of increases for the highest bands is the 
order of two or three times the decreases of the lowest band, reflecting the distribution of 
numbers of dwellings in the bands. 
 
Table 10 Changes in Council Tax Bills as a consequence of the Revaluation and 
Rebanding and Reweighting Multipliers 
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Authority 
 
A to 
A1 
A to 
A2 
B C D E F G to 
G1 
G to 
G2 
H 
Aberdeen 
Aberdeenshire 
Argyll & Bute 
Dundee City 
East Dunbartonshire 
City of Edinburgh 
Eilean Siar 
City of Glasgow 
Renfrewshire 
Scottish Borders 
South Ayrshire 
-32.4 
-25.5 
-33.0 
-26.2 
-31.1 
-33.7 
-19.0 
-28.3 
-29.6 
-28.8 
-27.5 
-18.9 
-10.7 
-19.6 
-11.4 
-17.4 
-20.4 
-2.8 
-13.9 
-15.6 
-14.5 
-13.1 
-18.9 
-10.7 
-19.6 
-11.4 
-17.4 
-20.4 
-2.8 
-13.9 
-15.6 
-14.5 
-13.1 
-18.9 
-10.7 
-19.6 
-11.4 
-17.4 
-20.4 
-2.8 
-13.9 
-15.6 
-14.5 
-13.1 
-18.9 
-10.7 
-19.6 
-11.4 
-17.4 
-20.4 
-2.8 
-13.9 
-15.6 
-14.5 
-13.1 
3.3 
13.7 
2.4 
12.8 
5.2 
1.3 
23.7 
9.6 
7.5 
8.8 
10.7 
18.6 
30.6 
17.6 
29.5 
20.8 
16.3 
42.1 
25.8 
23.4 
24.9 
27.1 
29.8 
42.9 
28.6 
41.7 
32.2 
27.3 
55.5 
37.7 
35.1 
36.7 
39.1 
62.2 
78.6 
60.8 
77.1 
65.2 
59.1 
94.3 
72.1 
68.8 
70.9 
73.8 
62.2 
78.7 
60.8 
77.1 
65.3 
59.1 
94.4 
72.1 
68.9 
70.9 
73.8 
 
These results are naturally specific to the precise weights applied.  For example the 
extension of the weighting range from 3 to 6 in this case has been achieved by increasing 
the weights on bands above D and introducing a lower rate for A1 (B, C, D and E weights 
are unchanged).  Different combinations of weights will produce different outcomes but 
the patterns will be similar.  Given these internal dynamics it is difficult to be definitive 
on the distributive implications of reforming council tax parameters.  There are four 
general conclusions. 
 
First, increasing the multiplier range will lead to higher bills for the households living in 
the top half of the bands but the effect will vary dependent on the local council band 
distribution of dwellings.   Second, the increases in council bills will be much higher for 
the relatively small number of households in the highest bands than the reductions to a 
much larger number of households in the lowest bands.  This effect is strongest in areas 
where the relative numbers of dwellings in the highest bands are low.  Third, these effects 
will be magnified for households whose homes are reclassified into a different band.  
Finally, doubling the tax multiplier will lead to council tax payments rising by 20% or 
more for households living in F band or above and more than 60% in G2 and H bands.     
 
 
Simplifying Assumptions and Wider Issues 
 
This study aims to consider the coincident impact of a revaluation, extending the bands 
from eight to ten and doubling the tax multiplier range from 3 to 6.  This empirical 
research has focused on eleven authorities as representative of Scotland and the financial 
simulation undertaken is based on the assumptions that aggregate central funding and 
individual local authority's expenditure are fixed.  While the research is based on only a 
sample of authorities in Scotland they represent 44% of the population and the four main 
cities.    By treating the eleven authorities as a closed system and simulating changes to 
national council tax parameters the results of the research can be taken as generally 
indicative of patterns likely to occur across Britain.     
 
However, there are a number of simplifying assumptions. The analysis here has presumed 
local authority expenditure remains constant but in reality the spatial redistribution of 
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central government funding is likely to lead to consequential impacts on spending which 
will moderate the impact on council tax levels.  Similarly the large falls in council tax 
bills for those in the lower bands with more bands and increasing the multiplier range 
may lead to expenditure on council tax benefits falling (unless there was a huge increase 
in take up, which seems unlikely). This would be an advantage of the reforms considered 
and could enable council tax rates to be increased by less than forecast.  However, not all 
recipients of council tax benefit are in the lowest bands, for example the elderly. To 
produce robust estimates of this effect requires knowledge of the number of households 
receiving benefits in each band within each authority and a prediction of how this would 
change with rebanding.  In the absence of such data it is not possible to be offer a 
definitive conclusion but the issue is considered in more detail in Jones et al (2002). 
 
Given that any rebanding (and possibly multiplier reweighting) exercise will necessarily 
be accompanied by a revaluation the impact of the two must be considered together.  The 
scale of these changes, even those purely the consequence of a revaluation, are likely to 
create short-term financial difficulties for some households. There will be a further 
impact on households whose bills rise because the knock on effect will be a reduction in 
their house price.   The additional pressures on household bills and the narrowing of 
bands are likely to lead to a high number of appeals.  Furthermore Jones et al (2006) 
argue that a revaluation of properties under the council tax could also cause major 
disruptions to the finances of local authorities.  It is probable that these impacts will be on 
a magnified scale compared with revaluations under a system of pure capital value based 
taxation (or under the former domestic rating system).  Rebanding will exaggerate this 
impact and narrower bands will lead to more appeals.  These effects could reinforce the 
political pressures for the introduction of a broader base of local taxes including income 
tax and might ultimately threaten the existence of council tax.  In mitigation supporters 
will point to the low costs of administration of council tax through use of bands 
compared with a property tax based on capital values.    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The council tax was introduced in 1993 but there is now a growing concern about the 
structure of the tax and there is a strong political movement to resolve this by increasing 
the number of bands.  However, the research on this topic has been limited.  The most 
important study to date, by the NPI (2004), is an analysis based at the aggregate regional 
level.  The NPI research does not identify the distinct effects of changing the bands from 
changing the multipliers.  It finds that increasing the number of bands (combined with a 
revaluation) from 8 to 10, together with changing multipliers, leaves the greatest losers as 
households in low banded properties in high inflation areas whatever the precise formula 
applied.   As a consequence the NPI proposes a solution incorporating distinct regional 
band structures and multipliers.  However, the analysis suffers from ignoring intra-
regional house price structures/changes and from the lack of a sub-model of local 
authority resource equalisation. 
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There are already regional band structures in Britain, in Scotland and Wales.  The 
research presented here in effect considers the regional dimension but the results also 
have wider implications for Britain as a whole.  This study demonstrates that merely 
considering a regional analysis underestimates substantially change in the housing 
market, both at the intra-urban and in the inter-urban levels.  The implications for  
council tax revaluation, rebanding and redefining multipliers are reviewed taking into 
account actual levels of local authority expenditures and the resource equalisation 
formulae and other allowances.  The research finds very different results from the NPI.  
The key difference between our research and NPI is that the basic revaluation and the 
moderate reform with ten bands and wider multipliers hit the low band homes biggest in 
the high inflationary areas. In our study we find that the biggest winners would be the 
lowest bands in all regions.  
 
The effects of revaluation and/or rebanding are defined by our simulations as neutral for 
the set of sample authorities as a whole.  However, the results indicate that the significant 
differential housing market performance in Scotland over the nine years 1991-2000 
translates into substantive changes to the structure of tax bands in different localities.  
The analysis shows that the effects of a revaluation on council tax bills, after nine years,  
have far more effect on the redistribution of central government financial support than 
modifications to the banding. The impact of rebanding is muted but changing the tax 
multiplier range is of much greater significance to the distribution of central financial 
support. 
 
Council tax bills will be magnified compared to the changes in local authority funding.  
The impact on individual households of a revaluation will be pronounced in relatively 
affluent authority areas in upper valuation bands, and especially for households whose 
home switches to a higher band.  The influence of increasing the number of bands is 
limited in comparison.  Changing the tax multiplier range has a far more substantive 
effect. The magnitude of such changes is demonstrated here by the doubling of the 
multiplier range: combined with a change of band some household bills could more than 
double with bills at the other extreme falling by more than a third.  However, there is 
clearly a local dimension to these changes and those who lose out will be substantially 
smaller than those who benefit.    
 
Although the study is based in one region these conclusions imply that reconfiguring the 
council tax will lead to substantial inter-regional and intra-regional ramifications in 
Britain to council tax bills and house prices. These conclusions are tempered by 
variations caused by the local dimension of the tax including local authority autonomy.  
Not withstanding any indirect or consequential impacts on local expenditure, benefits and 
appeals, these findings show that increases in bands will have little impact on the 
regressive nature of the council tax but regular revaluations are more equitable.  Changes 
in the number of bands will also mean greater costs in the preparation of the council tax 
register through greater care in the valuation process and potentially more appeals.  The 
impact of changing the multiplier range is much easier to implement than rebanding and a 
more efficient way of redistributing the burden of the council tax.  
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Appendix  Detailed Assumptions of Financial Simulation and Formulae Applied 
 
In order to carry out the simulations assume a range of variables constant including: 
 
1. Government Aided Expenditure (GAE); 
2. Special Needs of Islands allowance (SNI); 
3. Special one-off allowance for deprivation (SPD); 
4. Loan charges and support for PPP projects (LC); 
5. Housing and council tax benefit (HCTB); 
6. The holdback payment (Holdback); 
7. National adjusted Government Supported Expenditure (TGSE); 
8. National Total Aggregate External Finance (TAEF). 
 
 
Local authority non-housing revenue (LANR) is composed of two elements.  These are 
Aggregate External Finance (AEF) and Local Authority Self Financing Expenditure 
(LASFE).   The relationship between these variables can be expressed as in the following 
equation: 
 
ititit AEFLASFELANR +=          
 
where 
 
itLANR  = local authority revenue generated from non-housing related 
sources; 
itLASFE   = local authority Self Financing Expenditure from Council tax; 
itAEF   = Aggregate External Finance for local authority i at period t. 
 
LASFE represents approximately 20% of local authority expenditure in Scotland.  The 
funds are generated largely from the council tax. The remaining 80% of expenditure in 
Scotland is funded by Aggregate External Finance.  It relates to the grant support paid by 
the Scottish Executive.  The total level of AEF for the 3 forward years is determined by 
Scottish Ministers as part of the Expenditure Review process which takes place every 2 
years.  In 2001/2002, a minimum grant “floor” was built into the settlement calculation, 
to ensure that all councils receive at least a minimum guaranteed increase in AEF for 
each year.  The level of the floor for each year is set with reference to the aggregate 
increase in AEF.  This was 5% for 2001-02.  Where an individual council’s AEF 
allocation from the distribution formula is below the floor in any year, its allocation is 
increased up to the floor, by redistributing grant from other councils based on their share 
of total AEF.    
 
 
The total yield in council tax, LASFEit, is equal to the number of equivalents, 
Dequivalents, multiplied by the band D rate set by each local authority, D, multiplied by 
the percentage of properties assumed to pay, Payment Assumption.  The payment 
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assumption is dependent on the level of non-collection in the locality and the LASFEit 
formula is shown below.  
 
itLASFE  = DEquivalentsit x  Payment Assumption  x  Dit 
 
 
Aggregate External Finance is made up of 3 components: Specific Grants (SG), Non-
Domestic Rate Income (NDRI) and Revenue Support Grant (RSG).  This can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
AEFit = SGit + NDRIit + RSGit        
 
The allocation and distribution of Specific Grants is set centrally, and linked to specific 
policy initiatives and expectations.  They account for around 10% of total AEF, with the 
main grants ring-fencing local authority expenditure on policing, social work and certain 
education initiatives. 
 
 
The Revenue Support Grant is calculated as a residual, and functions simply as a 
balancing factor at both the national and individual local authority level.  It can be 
expressed as: 
 
itititit NDRISGAEFRSG −−=         
 
Thus, total non-housing revenue generated by each local authority is equal to: 
 
itnitititit LASFERSGNDRISGLANR +++= −       
 
 
The total Aggregate External Finance (AEF) distributed to each authority is calculated as 
follows: 
 
ititit NSGSEGSEAEF −=          
 
GSE represents the amount that central government think councils need to spend on the 
delivery of services.  The formula for the Government Supported Expenditure (GSE) in 
2000/2001 contained a number of elements.   These variables are as follows: 
 
• Grant Aided Expenditure (GAE).  This is the amount local authorities need to spend 
to provide a standard level of service; 
 
• An allowance for the Special Needs of the Islands (SNI); 
 
• The special one-off allowance for deprivation (SDP); 
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• Estimates of loan charges and support for PFI/PPP projects (LC); 
 
• An assessment of the expenditure on housing and council tax benefits of each 
authority net of DSS subsidy (HCTB); 
 
The summation of these variables gives the relationship expressed in the following 
equation: 
 
itititititititit HoldbackHCTBLCCTSSDPSNIGAEGSE ++++++=    
 
Not all adjusted GSE is supported through AEF.  The proportion of adjusted GSE which 
is not supported through AEF (NSGSE) is calculated as follows: 
 
( )
t
it
ttit quivalentslandBandDETotalS
lentsandDEquivaAuthorityB
TAEFTGSENSGSE
cot
*−=     
 
This formula assumes that the amount of non-supported government support expenditure 
for individual local authorities is distributed among authorities in proportion to their share 
of the national council tax base.  It is calculated as a proportion of the difference between 
national Government Support Expenditure (TGSE) and national Aggregate External 
Finance (TAEF). 
 
 
This approach differed from that applied by the Scottish Executive in 2000/01 by inoring 
a £15m holdback payment  and the Council Tax Safety Net for each authority (CTS).  
This limited year on year movements in grant distribution arrangements.  It was 
calculated to protect councils from changes in relevant support expenditure allocation of 
more than +/-£28 per Band D equivalent council tax payer.  Relevant supported 
expenditure comprises elements of Government Supported Expenditure but excluded 
100% specific grants (the Excellence Fund Core Programme and Excellence Fund 
Special Programme), and changes in Joint Board requirements. 
 
